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BALANCING INJURIES IN DETERMINING THE
RIGHT TO AN INJUNCTION.
As the tendency of industrial establishments to concentrate and condense in certain localities each year increases,
largely due to economic conditions, convenience- to market, etc., in proportion thereto does it become more
difficult for the courts to determine the relative rights of
such establishments as opposed to the rights of smaller
property-holders in such vicinage. The manufacturing
neighborhoods about large cities,-more especially those
associated with the allied industries of coal, iron, and steel,
-are at the present day so constantly darkened by vast
clouds of dust, smoke, cinder, and obnoxious gases that man's
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right to pure air and light has been there practically destroyed, in so far as a possibility of enforcing it is concerned. The question has therefore become one of great interest in the law: Will a court of equity consider the balance
of injury when a complainant comes before it asking for an
injunction against a defendant company for polluting the
atmosphere?
The doctrine that every man is necessarily entitled to an injunction, or even to damages, when his rights are encroached
upon, finds but few precedents in the decisions. From the
earliest ages the peculiar characteristics of particular districts have necessitated a discrimination in deciding as to the
*applicability of general legal principles to the conditions there
found; and that which, for example, may be negligence in
one locality or season, may not be so at another place or
time; so although a bone-boiling establishment, nitro-glycerine factory, or even a steel-mill, would not be permitted
to exist in a residential portion of a large city, yet there
are localities, where owing to the prevalency of different
conditions and surroundings such concerns would have a
right to continue their respective industries. Where then
shall the courts draw the line? How shall they determine
the extent to which the individual should give way to the
general need in cases where the right of eminent domain
does not exist? When such cases come before common law
courts, as actions for damages, they are of relatively facile
solution; but when the complainant comes before a Chancellor, claiming that he has no adequate remedy at law, that
the injury alleged is irreparable, and that to avoid a possible
multiplicity of suits or interminable litigation he prays the intervention of a court of equity by an injunction, what then
is to guide the court? Has the suitor a substantial "right"
to the injunction if a real property interest is injured,
regardless of the possibility of greater injury being done
thereby to the defendant and the community, or is the
granting of an injunction here to be considered as a matter
of grace and not of right?
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In a very recent case (Sullivan v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Co., 2o8 Pa. 540) the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
came to the conclusion, despite its opposite tendency in
most of the decisions previous to that time, that it was not
a question of grace but of right, that the question of
balance of injury was not to be considered where a
substantial right of property was invaded; to this decision
three justices dissented, two of whom filed separate opinions.
The facts of the case were as follows: the defendant, a steel
company, occupied land in the city of Pittsburg upon which
had been situated for forty-four years its extensive mills
and blast-furnaces, which had been in constant operation
for that length of time; above these mills upon a bluff were
situated eight houses of the plaintiffs. The district had
always been subject to the smoke and dust from the many
mills along the Allegheny River but prior to 19O1 had not
been subject to ore-dust in injurious quantities. About 19O1
the defendant enlarged the furnaces and began using a
greater quantity of fine, dust ore, owing to the fact that
the rock ore formerly used was becoming exhausted. This
fine ore produced a great amount of dust which escaped
from the furnaces and settled on the plaintiffs' houses, ruined
fabrics and paints, fruit and shade trees, and depreciated
the value of the properties. There was no evidence whatever
as to faulty construction or negligent management of the
furnaces; in fact.it was proven that the escape of the oredust was a financial loss to the defendant, and that the company had attempted in various ways to prevent it. There
was some evidence that there were appliances in use
at other mills to prevent such escape of dust which the*
defendant had not tested, but nothing to prove that they
had been generally adopted, or that they were efficient for
the purpose. The material facts in the case were not disputed, and the court held that, as the properties of the plaintiffs were being destroyed they were entitled to an injunction. There was a great amount of testimony taken which
proved that the locality in which the defendant's mills were
situated was wholly given up to manufacturing interests, and
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that the escape of ore-dust in more or less volume was an
incident of the steel business everywhere. The mills it was
shown represented an investment of $5,oooooo, and about

eleven thousand men were there given employment, to whom
about $5ooooo a month was paid in wages. In the opinion
of the court it was said: "It is urged that as an injunction
is a matter of grace, and not of right, and more injury will
result in awarding it than in refusing, it ought not to go out
in this case. A Chancellor does act as of grace, but that
grace sometimes becomes a matter of right to the suitor in
his court, and, when it is clear that the law cannot give
protection and relief, the Chancellor can no more withhold
his grace than the law can deny protection and relief, if
able to give them." But the Chief Justice took the ground
that in some cases, as here, if the dispute is between two
conflicting rights, the matter should be ascertained at law
before equity will decide in favor of either. And Mr. Justice
Thompson, dissenting, said: "As a decree in equity is a
matter of grace a Chancellor will not make it where it will
produce a greater injury than it will prevent, and because it
is a matter of grace will balance the inconvenience that
may be caused either by granting or refusing it."
What, then, is to be understood from the majority opinion
of the court in this case? Is a court of equity to have no
freedom to discriminate, to consider, and to weigh the effect
of its decrees? Must it grant an injunction whenever the
right is proven, and the injury thereto, regardless of all
else? This decision must stand for the proposition that the
Most insignificant owner of property in or near a manufacturing district, if his petty property is injured, can elect to refuse
damages and to insist upon the removal or discontinuance of
the cause of the injury; he can insist for the sake of giving
free rein to his sentiment in holding his small home that the
great industrial interests must either stop the injury or go
elsewhere. It is hardly to be conceded that such is the
general understanding in the law. True, the owner of a
large estate can not insist that the peasant give up his home:
the industrial can not come into the residential section and
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assert its right to stay, nor can it hold to its former custom
of sending forth volumes of soot, smoke, and gas if, for
instance, it becomes surrounded with residences, and finds
itself alone in that locality. The suitability of the industry
to the community is the-important question to decide where
there is no negligence. A resident of a city or town must
make some sacrifices for the advantages which he may
derive in other ways from living there. In the leading
English case (St. Helen'sSmelting Co. v. Tipping, i16 E. C.
L. R. 6o8) the Court said: "If a man lives in a town, it
is necessary that he should subject himself to the consequences of those operations of trade which may be carried on
in his immediate locality, which are actually necessary
for trade and commerce, and also for the enjoyment of
property, and for the benefit of the inhabitants and the
public at large." This may to some extent even affect
his property rights, as appears from the language of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in McDevitt v. Natural Gas
Company (16o Pa. 367), in which case a bill was filed to
restrain the gas company from laying its pipe under a
sidewalk in front of the plaintiff's property. In Huckenstine's Appeal (7o Pa. lO6) the Court said that.when the aid
of a court exercising the power of a Chancellor is sought,
it "must look at the customs of the people, the characteristics of their business, the common uses of property, and the
peculiar circumstances of the place wherein it is called upon
to exercise the power," and that "people who live in such
a city (Pittsburg) or within its sphere of influence, do so of
choice, and they voluntarily subject themselves to its peculiarities and its discomforts, for the greater benefit they think
they derive from their residence or their business there."
In another English case (Wood v. Sutcliffe, 8 Eng., L. &
E. 217), in which a bill in equity for an injunction was filed
to restrain the defendants from pouring into a stream " any
dyes, or indigo, or madder" to the detriment of the plaintiffs, worsted-spinners, who were lower riparian owners,
the injunction was refused and the Court said: "In cases
of this nature the court must have regard not only to the
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dry strict rights of the plaintiff and defendant, but must
have regard to the surrounding circumstances,--to the rights
and interests of other persons which may be more or less
involved in it. . . . We cannot concur on the proposition that on the mere dry fact of the plaintiff having the
abstract right, and that right being infringed, in ever so
minute a way, or ever so little to the practical damnification
of the plaintiff, the court of equity will as a matter of course,
upon the right being established, grant the injunction."
In the most recent work on Equity (Bispham, p. 614, 7th
ed.) the author says, in referring to injunctions against
noisy and offensive industrial establishments: "The jurisdiction in all these cases should be exercised with great
caution. Lord Chancellor Selborne, in Gaunt v. Fynney,
(L. R. 8, ch. ii) quoted with approval the old Scotch
maxim which forbids a man to use his own rights 'in
emulationem vicini;' and said that neighbors everywhere
oughkt not to be extreme or unreasonable either in the exercise of their own rights or in the restriction of the rights of
each other. Nevertheless, while regard should.be had to this
doctrine, yet, on the other hand, due weight should be given
to the right of every man to the comfortable enjoyment of his
dwelling. A dangerous business may be a nuisance; but
this may depend upon whether the locality is populous or
otherwise. (Dilworth's Appeal, 91 Pa. 247)." Likewise
an offensive steel-mill, extensive brick-works, coke-ovens,
or similar establishments from which obnoxious gases and
deleterious fumes are emitted, may be a nuisance; but it
always depends upon not only the question of the populousness of the community, but also upon the general character
of industrial interests there established.
After a very careful reading of such expressions of
judicial opinion on this subject, to what conclusion does one
arrive? It is surely evident that the general belief and
impression in the profession is that courts of equity will
weigh the effect of their decrees before making them, and
that the balance of injury is a most important factor in determining the advisability of summary action on their part.
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The cases that seem to stand for the opposite rule will
almost always, upon critical examination, show some peculiar or special reason for the action of the court in resorting
to the extraordinary remedy of an-injunction. There are
a number of cases which are often cited in favor of granting
an injunction; in one commonly referred to (Campbell v.
Seaman, 63 N. Y. 568) where the manufacturing of bricks
was enjoined as causing material injury by smoke and coalgas to the plaintiff's trees and property generally; there is
a very good example of the necessity for special consideration and examination of the character of the community.
The injunction was granted and the court specially pointed
out that the brick-works was the only manufacturing plant
in the vicinity, and that moreover it had not been in continuous operation but was used orily at special tithes or periods.
It is interesting to compare this case with Huckenstine's
Appeal, supra. One of the strongest cases against considering the balance of injury is that of Cogswell v. N. Y.,
and H. R. R. Co., (1O3 N. Y. io) in which the railway
company was restrained from maintaining an engine-house
so near to the plaintiff's dwelling as to endanger health and to
render plaintiff's premises untenable by reason of smoke,
cinders, and soot, and it was clearly stated that the railway
company could not justify the nuisance on the ground
that the engine-house was a necessity in the operation of its
road.
The question must ever be one of great difficulty, to decide how far the useful trades may encroach and how much
citizens must surrender of their primal rights. Our modem
civilization is so organized that the healthful and peaceful
dwellings of the citizens must of necessity be in close proximity to the industrial establishments in which their owners
receive employment. We, then, find ourselves with two
interests very closely associated, but which must in thi§
respect be in constant conflict; and the courts in deciding
disputes between such interests must ask each to give up
something of what pertains to comfort and convenience;
17
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but for what the minor party must thus surrender he can be
fully repaid by an action at law for damages.
Among the cases of interest upon this question is an Indiana case (Owen v. Phillips,73 Ind. 284), in which a bill to
enjoin the rebuilding of a flour-mill was filed by an adjoining owner; the coinsel for the plaintiff took the ground
-that if there was an infringement of a real substantial right,
an injunction would be the proper remedy, and the lower
.court so instructed; the appellate court upon review called
special attention to the question of locality and in referring
to the instruction said: "Under the instruction as framed,
all interferences, lawful or unlawful, with the property of
another, would supply grounds for relief by injunction.
The law recognizes no such doctrine;" and the injtinction
.was refused. In another "mill " case (Gilbert v. Showerman, 23 Mich. 448), the plaintiff occupied the upper stories
of a building ap a residence, and the defendants fitted up
the adjoining building as a flour-mill Both were in a
business block of the city of Detroit. Among other alleged
objectionable features of the mill was that ."the fires of
said boiler and engine generate large quantities of soot and
cinder." There was no dispute as to the leading facts; and
in its opinion the court said: "There can be no question
that the mill causes annoyance to the complainant and his
family, and renders the occupation of his building as a
residence less desirable, but we are not satisfied by the evidence that there has been any want of due care or any
wilful disregard of the rights of their neighbors, in the manner in which the defendants have carried on their business."
And also that: "We cannot shut our eyes to the obvious
truth that if the running of this mill can be enjoined, almost
*any manufacturing plant in any of our cities can be enjoined
:upon similar reasons.

.

.

.

Minor inconveniences must

be remedied by actions for damages rather than by the severe
process of injunction." As to this want of "due care, or
wilful disregard of the rights of others," the plaintiff must
show affirmatively, in such a case, by a preponderance of
proof, that a practical change in the construction of the
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structures could be made so as to lessen the annoyance
-complained of. Vide Shearm. and Redf. on Negligence,
No. 12.
The purpose of this .article is to contend that courts of
equity should not be restricted in such a way in the exercise
of their extraordinary jurisdiction, as they certainly would
be if they were compelled to grant an injunction upon a
good case,-so far as a right and the infringement thereof,having been made out, and were not allowed to consider the
advisability of granting it. The old doctrine that they could
not move in the case of a nuisance until the plaintiff's right
had been established at law is now obsolete; but the very
nature of the decree of a court of equity is such that it must
be conceded that the court acts within its own discretion;
and if this were otherwise, the real value of its jurisdiction
would be nil. A writ in a court of equity can rightfully be
demanded to prevent irreparable injury, interminable litigation, and a multiplicity of suits, and in a proper case an
injunction will be granted; but the court, realizing that it is
a matter of grace and that it rests within its own discretion,
will not grant it where it is evident that the general effect
of it would be to cause more injury to the defendant and to
the public at large than would be consistent with the preservation of the plaintiff's free and unrestricted enjoyment of
his rights. In the state of Pennsylvania there is a line of cases
which offers a most striking instance of, the tendency of the
courts of equity to consider always the balance of injury,the cases following Sanderson v. Coal Company.; the doctrine there laid down is, however, restricted to cases of
property where the owner of minerals can bring them, to
the surface in no other way than that which caues the
injury complained of; but those cases offer a most pertinent
example of the fact that in certain communities, in the
absence of negligence on the part of the defendant, not even
damages can be recovered for injury to property which his
been caused by the development of the natural resources of
land. It has at times been suggested that the fact that there
is a remedy at law; either by indictment or action, will' prevent the issuance of an injunction; but the general weight
of authority is against such a theory, however, the fact
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that there is a legal remedy will induce a court of equity
to inquire very carefully into the peculiar exigencies of a
case before granting an injunction,-another striking instance that there is no abstract right vested in anyone to an
injunction of which a court must take cognizance. Everyone has a right to the quiet enjoyment of his own; however the right, so far as the injunction is concerned, lies not
in the individual but in the court; it may resort to severe
measures to remedy the situation, but as to whether it should
do so or not is a question to be decided within the sound
discretion of the court after due consideration.
On the opposite side of the question one often sees quoted
the remarks of Lord Eldon in AttorneyGeneral v. Nichol,
(16 Ves. 342), in which case he said: "Where the injury
is not susceptible of adequate compensation of damages, or
where the injury is a constantly recurring grievance a court
of equity will interpose by injunction;" and Lord Hardwicke in The Fishmongers' Company v. The East India
Company, (I Dick. 163) placed the jurisdiction of a court
of equity over nuisances upon "that head of mischief, that
sort of material injury to the comfort of the existence" of
those who are affected by the nuisance, "requiring a power
to prevent as well as to remedy an evil, for which damages,
more or less would be given in a court of law." Such
expressions in the opinions are merely explanatory in their
nature. The situation outlined by Lord Eldon is one where
equity may rightfully interpose, but it does not follow simply
because the injury is not susceptible of compensation in
damages or is of a recurring nature that an injunction must
necessarily issue; that the court will act blindly and not
consider the effect of its acts.
To revert to the original question then; Will a court of
equity balance injuries in deciding upon the issuance of an
*injunction? Most assuredly' from the very nature of its
jurisdiction it must do so, and although it is not contended
that the balance of injury alone will decide the question, it is
certainly very often, when coupled with the evidence in a particular case, a question of much importance, and will be
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considered, and even may at times prevent the plaintiff from
securing an injunction. The position of the defendant must,
however, be a very strong one to warrant a refusal to grant
an injunction that is based on the question of the balance
of injury alone.
Fred. L. Orlady.

